Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain

Question: Discuss about the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. Answer: Introduction: According to the law of contract, there is a difference between an offer and invitation to treat. When the offer is accepted, a contract is formed between the parties. An invitation to treat is made to invite offers from the other party. An advertisement is also generally an invitation to treat. The law provides that an invitation to treat cannot be accepted for the purpose of the formation of a valid contract. The leading case in this regard is that of Pharmaceutical Society v Boots Cash Chemists Ltd [1953]. The court held that display of goods does not amount to an offer however it is merely an invitation to treat. The facts of this case are similar to the present problem. In this case also the court stated that the goods that have been displayed on the shelf of a shop together with their price, does not amount to an offer, but they are just an invitation to treat. Another important case is Fisher v Bell (1961). Here, a flick knife was displayed by the defendant is the shop window, along with the price tag. According to a statute, it was an offense to offer the flick knife for sale. However, the court stated that the defendant cannot be convicted as the goods displayed in the shop window is not an offer and they were merely an invitation to treat. In the present case also, Halldora saw some limited edition Grace Hopper Series One pens at the display shelf of Alf bookstore. However, when she brought all the confidence to the sales counter, these sales cashier Eva told her that all the pens have been reserved. As in this case, the display of pens does not amount to an offer, it cannot be accepted by Halldora, and consequently, a contract has not been created between Halldora and Alf Bookstore. Therefore, the action of bringing the pens to the sales counter does not amount to the acceptance of the offer and in this case, there is no contract between Halldora and Alf Bookstore. In the present case, an offer has been made by Halldora to purchase all the 5000 Grace Hopper Series 2 pens on thirty-day credit terms. However, in reply, Deodat stated that they could deliver all the 5000 pens to Halldora for cash on delivery. At the same time, Deodat stated that they will charge 50% more, because Halldora wanted to purchase all the limited edition pens. Halldora did not accept these terms and replied our letter that she was not ready to pay a cent more than the stated price. However, later on she changed her mind and wrote another letter in which she accepted all the terms stated by Deodat. But before receiving this letter, Deodat had already received the letter in which Halldora had rejected the offer. Therefore, they had sold the pens to a competitor of Halldora by the time they receive the second letter of acceptance from Halldora. A leading authority on this subject is Hyde v Wrench (1840). Wrench had made an offer to sell his farm to Hyde for 1200 but he refus ed. Therefore, Wrench wrote a letter to Hyde's agent and offered to sell the farm at a price of 1000. In return, Hyde stated that he was ready to pay 950 for the farm and was not ready to accept the offer made by Wrench. However, later on, Hyde decided to accept the offer. The verdict of the court was that in this case, a binding contract was not formed between the parties. An offer has been made by the defendant, but it was not unconditionally accepted by the other party (Dickinson v Dodds. Dickinson v Dodds, 1876). On the other hand, an offer of his own has been made by the plaintiff. In this way, the plaintiff had rejected the offer that was earlier made by the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff was not competence to revive the offer made by the defendant. On these grounds, it can be set in the present case that as the offer made by Deodat was rejected by Halldora, just say no for cannot be revived by her and she cannot accept the offer Later on. As a result, a contract is not present between the parties. According to the general rule, under the law of contract, it has been provided that silence cannot be treated as acceptance. The basis of this rule is that the acceptance should take some form of objective manifestation of the intention of the party to whom the offer was made, to accept the terms of agreement. Generally, such intention can be expressed in some form of a positive action. This is for the purpose of making sure that a contract is not enforced against an unwilling party. For example, if it has been written by party A that if it does not hear from party B, it will assume that party B had sold its horse to party A for a price of $600. Later on, this note is seen by B and he is mentally ready to sell the horse for the mentioned price, but could not do so as a result of some mishandling a part of its agent. In such a case, the court will not arrive at the conclusion that the offer has been accepted by B. This is due to the reason that although a mental decision has been made by B to accept the contract, however the fact of the acceptance of the contract was not convey to A. as a result, a binding contract has not been created between the parties and A cannot be allowed to bring the successful claim against B for the breach of contract. It is recognized by the Singapore courts that there are certain circumstances where even silence may result in acceptance. However, it needs to be kept in mind in this regard that were silence can be treated as being acceptance of the offer is still an issue that will be decided by the law on the basis of the given facts of each case. Any conclusion in this regard is not restricted to the above mentioned scenario. The leading authority in this regard is that of Felthouse v Bindley (1862). This is a major case of contract law, in which the rule was provided that one party cannot force an obligation on the other party to expressly reject the offer made by the other party. Sometimes this is also known as the rule that silence may not amount to acceptance. In Felthouse v Bindley, a builder, Felthouse was living in London. He was willing to purchase a particular horse from his nephew, John Felthouse. The nephew wrote a letter after previous discussion regarding the horse. In reply, the uncle stated that, "if I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mind at 30 and 15s. There was no reply from the nephew as he was involved in the auction being held at his farm. He instructed the person who was running the options, William Bindley, that he should not sell that particular horse to any other person. However by accident, Bindley sold the horse to some other person. Under these circumstances, Felthouse sued Bindley for the tort of conversion. For this purpose, it was required that the uncle should establish that the horse was his property and in order to do so, he was required to establish that a valid contract has been created between the parties. On the other hand, it was argued by Bindley that a contract has not been formed as the acc eptance of the offer was never communicated by the nephew to his uncle. While delivering its decision, the court stated that the ownership of the horse has not been transferred to the uncle because in this case the acceptance of the offer was not present. The court stated that the acceptance needs to be clearly communicated, and it cannot be imposed on the other party as a result of the silence of one of the parties. Therefore, the court stated that the uncle did not have any right to compel a sale to silence while the contract would fail only due to repudiation. Therefore even if the nephew was interested in carrying out the sale, his intention was not communicated to his uncle. In the present case also, Halldora had written an e-mail to Erna in which she had stated that if she didn't hear from Erna, she will assume that Erna had agreed to this arrangement. As Erna had not replied to this e-mail, Halldora wants to know if a binding contract has been created between them. In this case, a binding contract has not been created between Halldora and Erna. The reason is that in this case, Erna had not replied to the offer made by Halldora. Hence, there is no acceptance of the offer made by Halldora. As in this case, one of the essential elements necessary for the creation of a valid contract is not present, there is no binding contract. According to the general rule, that is applicable in such cases, if a person owes some money to the other person and agrees to pay a part of this amount in for settlement, the law mentions that the part payment of the debt cannot be treated as good consideration. In return of the promised to forgo the rest of the amount this rule was stated in Pinnel's Case (1602). This rule provides that if A owes $100 to B and B accepts $50 as the final settlement of the debt on the due date, the law does not prevent B from claiming the rest of the amount later on. The reason behind this position of law is that in this case, there is no consideration provided by A big return of the promise made by B to accept the part payment as the full satisfaction of the debt. In this case, A is already bound to pay the full amount under the agreement that is based on the same principle that was provided in Stilk v Myrick (1809). This rule also protects the creditors against the economic duress by the debtors. On the other hand, the agreement to accept part payment will be binding if the debtor had supplied some fresh consideration at the request made by the creditor. Consideration can be provided in case the creditor has agreed to accept part payment at an earlier date as compared to the due date or if the creditor is ready to accept chattel instead of money or the part payment is accepted at a different place, other than the originally specified place. Although the rule provided in Pinnel's case appears to be somewhat harsh, but this rule has been affirmed by the House of Lords and it still represents the current law in Singapore. A parallel decision had been given in Foakes v Beer (1884), where it was held that consideration was not present to accept the part payment of the debt and forgo the interest on the judgment debt. Therefore in the present case, Erna may ask Halldora to pay the rest of the $10,000 on 5th April. The reason is that the promise made by Erna to forgive the remaining $10,000 is not supported by any consideration provided by Halldora. References Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463 Felthouse v Bindley (1862) EWHC CP J 35 Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605 Hyde v Wrench [1840] EWHC Ch J90 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1953] EWCA Civ 6 Pinnel's Case (1602) 5 CoRep 117a Stilk v Myrick [1809] EWHC KB J58